Good
Governance via the OMC? The cases of Employment and Social Inclusion
Caroline de la Porte*
I.
Introduction
Governance
in social policy is critical in the context of a deeper, wider and increasingly
diverse Union, but also a politically delicate
This
article assesses the governance of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in
social policy that is, par excellence, an interdisciplinary object of study.
Since it was conceptualized in 2000, the academic community has been intrigued
by the many issues in the Pandora’s Box of the “Open Method of Co-ordination”.
Among legal analysts, part of the debate is normatively driven, where a more
classical legal reference point, such as a directive, is the implicit point of
comparison. Belonging to “soft law”, the OMC is perceived as “weaker” than hard
law along the dimensions of obligation, precision or delegation,[5]
and is criticised for for its unknown effects and its non-judiciable character.[6]
However, legal analysts have also used concepts emanating from political science
in approaching soft law to move away from the dichotomous hard law vs. soft law
debate.[7]
Scott and Trubek institutionalised “new modes of governance” (NMG) among
lawyers,[8] defining
NMG in a broad manner as “any major departure from the classical Community
method”. Political scientists have emphasised the eminently political nature of
the OMC,[9]
which is used for the reform of employment and social policies, a sensitive
issue in all Member States.
In
essence, the OMC as a NMG is an iterative non-judiciable instrument that sets
policy objectives to be implemented by Member States in accordance with their
national systems and practice. The rhetoric on the OMC underlines that it is to
be implemented with respect to the principle of subsidiarity, which puts
emphasis on who and at which level power should be exercised, in the framework
of which the European Union can only take action if it brings in an element of
added value.[10]
The OMC was introduced during the Lisbon Summit of the Portuguese Presidency
“to better implement the long-term strategy for a competitive knowledge-based
economy with more and better employment and social cohesion” by 2010,[11]
alongside other EU instruments – from legislation to multi-annual
programmes. In procedural terms, the OMC consists of European-level
“guidelines”, or policy objectives, for the Union and its
This
article assesses the OMC in two areas, employment and social inclusion,
according to the principles of Participation, Coherence and Effectiveness, from
which operational governance criteria are derived. While Openness and
Accountability are also highly pertinent criteria, they will not be used for
the analysis due to problems of operationalisation. The fundamental reference
documents used for drawing up operational principles of governance are the
White Paper on Governance,[13]
and where relevant, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
II.
The Principles of Good Governance and Operational Criteria
A.
Openness
The
definition of “Openness” in the White Paper is that “The Institutions should
work in a more open manner… they should actively communicate about what the EU
does and the decisions it takes. They should use language that is accessible
and understandable for the general public”.[17]
It is a conception indicating that the EU should make rules and politics more
accessible, in terms of language and availability of information, to EU
citizens. The “openness” principle of the White Paper concerns public
accessibility and by extension, public debate.[18]
In the template defining the open method of co-ordination, “open” has two
slightly different dimensions. It first indicates that the EU level rules,
tools and policies – guidelines, best practices, quantitative indicators,
reports - can be “adapted” to the
national level.[19]
This means that in the OMC, compared to hard law, there is explicitly a wider
margin for compliance, with regard to the national systems, institutions and
rules. This is crucial for both employment and social policy, which are areas
of (quasi?) exclusive member state competency. It can also be interpreted as
ex-ante respect of subsidiarity - where all aspects of the OMC should be
“adapted” to national, regional and local contexts - that has been the object of
extensive academic analysis.[20]
It indicates, second, that the operating mechanism should be “open” to “various
actors of civil society”.[21]
Regarding civil society participation, it is the focal issue of “Participation”
and thus will not be an object of analysis here. Overall, the principle of
“openness” is partially normative, and partially, covered by Participation.
Hence, no operational criteria will be derived for this analysis on the OMC.
B. Accountability
In the White Paper on Governance, the issue of
accountability makes reference to clearly defined roles and mandates: “Roles in
the legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of the EU
institutions must explain and take responsibility for what it does in
C. Participation
The White Paper of Governance places considerable
emphasis on participation in terms of its input legitimacy and also its
expected output legitimacy: “the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU
policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain –
from conception to implementation.” This is in line with the
conception of subsidiarity in its widened form.[25]
The OMC has been conceived in this normative spirit: it is qualified as “an
important tool to improve transparency and democratic participation”.[26]
In the White Paper, considerable
emphasis is placed on the responsibility of “central governments” to ensure
meeting this principle: “Participation crucially depends on central governments
following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing EU policies”.[27] The document defining the OMC sets out that
governments are the main actors responsible for devising and implementing
policies derived from the EU level. In addition to central governments, the
White Paper highlights the value of civil society participation. The
Constitutional Treaty lays down the principle of participatory democracy,
according to which “…The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society...”.[28] The Lisbon Conclusions proclaim with
regard to the OMC that: “A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line
with the principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the
regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society,
will be actively involved, using varied forms of partnership.”[29]
According to the OMC template
“…the development of this method in its different stages should be open to the
participation of the various actors of civil society.”[30]
This participatory approach to European governance has been re-confirmed in the
revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005.[31]
In the area of social inclusion, the Constitutional Treaty recognises the OMC, although not by label.
It confirms the role of the core governmental actors for “cooperation” on
social protection policies and refers to the Social Protection Committee,
comprised of member state and Commission civil servants. However, there is no
reference to the need to involve NGOs or civil society organisations.[32]
From
these principles, I derive two criteria: the first is the creation of a core
policy community, which is a closed group of insiders, with relatively stable
membership and meeting on a regular basis to prepare work on their delegated
thematic area.[33]
I analyse the membership of the Committees that have been formed at the
national level. The second is the creation of a more open, more permeable and broader
policy network (of social partner and/or civil society organisations) that has
a stake in the issue concerned, without having any core decision-making power
in the process.[34]
The source of legitimacy for the involvement of actors is either Treaty or
policy-based.[35]
D. Coherence
The
White Paper stipulates that, “Policies and action must be coherent and easily
understood…. Coherence requires political leadership and a strong
responsibility on the part of Institutions to ensure a consistent approach
within a complex system”.[36] In the Constitutional Treaty,
considerable attention is devoted to consistency of policies: “The
The
criterion I derive from coherence is that for the policy areas under
examination, the policies have to be internally coherent, and have to be
coherent with the overarching goal of the Lisbon European Summit. To analyze
this, I will examine the policy content of the Employment and Social Inclusion
policies, focusing on their coherence throughout time, i.e. is
E.
Effectiveness
The
White Paper states that: “Policies must be effective and timely, delivering
what is needed on the basis of clear objectives, an evaluation of future impact
and, where available, of past experience.“ This aspect of the White Paper is
thus devoted to issues of output legitimacy, and prescribes clarity of means
and objectives to achieve these.
In
the template of the Open Method, two issues pertain to effectiveness. The first
is that of effectiveness through “learning”;[43]
i.e. Member States are incrementally to change their policies, based on what they
“learn” from the European objectives and guidelines, from the specific
recommendations made by the Commission in its analyses (in Joint Reports or
individual country recommendations), and from horizontal exchange of best
practices. In this light, the OMC template specifies that outcome in individual
Member States should be assessed on the basis of contextualised achievements:
via “progressions or relative achievements”.[44] There are several ambiguities with learning,
notably that it is perceived in these documents both as a means and as an end. Also,
much of the academic literature on the OMC highlights that one of its main
achievements has been that of fostering “learning”.[45]
Hence, this article will not focus in-depth on learning.
Secondly,
the OMC “can foster convergence… on common priorities”.[46]
These common priorities take the concrete form either of specific qualitative
objectives or of Union-wide quantitative benchmarks to achieve. The criterion
used in this analysis is the integration of core policies under each OMC into
the context of Member States. This will be assessed via key quantitative indicators
that have been created by Eurostat to reflect the objectives of each of the
OMCs.
III.
Empirical Analysis
For
each governance principle - Participation, Coherence and Effectiveness - this
article analyses the situation first in employment policy and thereafter in
social inclusion policy. To facilitate the empirical analysis in the areas of
employment and inclusion, the countries have been organised according to their
level of expenditure. In employment, core expenditure is in Active Labour
Market Policies (ALMP), representing the core supply-side “employability”
objectives of the EES; in social inclusion, core expenditure is represented by
social transfers, which represent the main instrument to prevent poverty.
A.
Participation
Regarding
participation, I analyse for employment and social inclusion, the key actors in
the core policy community and then actors involved in the broader policy
network.
1. Employment
a. Policy Community
The
primary policy community formed as a result of the EES is at national level,
and the secondary one involves the devolved levels of governance. The common
features, but also distinctions, of the policy community created for the EES in
the domestic contexts (of the EU-14)[47]
is summarised in table 1 below (columns 2 – 6).
The
core of the policy community at national level is located in the Labour
Ministry (see column 3). The civil servants from the Labour Ministry represent
their respective governments in the meetings of the European level policy
community for employment policy (EMCO). EMCO consists of two delegates per
The
secondary aspect of the policy community consists of coordination to involve
different levels of government. The main
trends of the involvement of these levels of government is indicated in column
6 of table 1 below. While there is no legal mandate for regional and local level
involvement in the EES, there has been political support for enhancing the
involvement of these levels of governance, particularly since 2000 when the OMC
and the concept of governance was in the spotlight of the Lisbon Summit. According to the template of the OMC[49]
that was conceptualised and also various Commission communications on the topic,[50]
the policy community should in theory include all public authorities at
national, regional, and local levels, by developing appropriate vertical
co-ordination procedures. Furthermore, there is increasingly a shift to
devolution of some aspects of labour market policies in all countries,
confirming the relevance to involve this level of governance in the EES,
particularly if it is to enhance
ex-post multi-level coordination as an information provision tool and more
fundamentally, to act as a policy-making template. In the EU-15, regional
and local level involvement depends on the division of competencies for labour
market issues; where there is a higher degree of devolution, there are more
chances of their involvement of the EES process. In some cases, the EES has
acted as an incentive for their involvement and has contributed to the
development of multi-level policy communities and coordination, e.g.
b.
Policy Network
In the context of the EES, the policy network
refers to social partners and also informal interest organisations that have a
stake in employment and labour market policy. National social partners’ have a
legal mandate for involvement. The main reference to national level social
partner involvement is in article 126, paragraph 2, Amsterdam EC Treaty, which
states that “Member States, having regard to national practices related to the
responsibilities of management and labour, shall regard promoting employment as
a matter of common concern”. Article 128.3, Amsterdam EC Treaty which asks the Member
States to provide the Council and the Commission with an annual report, does
not make any reference to the role of social partners in drafting the NAPs.
Despite this rather ambiguous legal clause, the involvement of social partners
has been encouraged by political incentives from the European Council and also
by the European Commission,[53]
which requires Member States to integrate social partners according to their
national practice. They are encouraged to participate from decision-making (in
policy issues of their remit) through implementation of policies.
The
social partners are in the process of the EES requested to contribute to the
objectives of their concern, notably the objectives around work organisation. Column
7 of Table 1 indicates that in half of the countries, social partners make
substantial contributions to their NAPempl and are thus quite highly
integrated, although this is essentially at the central national level and with
the general perception that the NAP is “owned” by ministerial departments But,
there have progressively been more direct contributions and/or a qualitative
improvement in the contributions: the crucial point here is a (slight) shift by
the social partners to take the EES more seriously as a political vehicle,
although they still lack time and also financial resources that prevents them
from making more adequate contributions. In addition, in all countries,
the social partners participate in the implementation of the policies under
their remit in the NAP. This is logical as the NAP, at the very least, is a
report that summarises all policies and measures undertaken throughout the
year, including those involving the social partners.
Nevertheless,
a crucial problem of social partner involvement in the EES remains that of a
fundamental agenda mismatch. Wage negotiations, central to social partner
activity, are not part of the EES guidelines, while employment policies are
mainly considered a government prerogative. That said, the political agenda of
the social partners is broadening to debate issues related to employment policy
as well.[54]
Indeed, social partners have revealed interest in guidelines that are primarily
addressed to governments: active and preventive measures for the unemployed and
inactive, job creation and entrepreneurship, making work pay, transforming
undeclared work into regular employment.[55]
In essence, trade unions prefer to influence the policy process in areas of
their remit through means that pre-existed the EES, that are more rooted in the
national institutional setting, and with which resources (either financial or
power or a combination of both) would be associated.
Regarding
informal interest organisations, there is no legal mandate for their
involvement, and thus their involvement is likely only in the case that
firstly, they are aware of the existence of the EES and secondly, that they
perceive it as an instrument to strengthen their own position or power. Column
8 of Table 1 shows that mostly there is a low take-up of the EES by civil
society organisations It has been used by informal interest organisations in
Table
1: Institutional
configuration of policy community and policy networks for the EES[56]
|
Expenditure on labour market policies |
Country |
Labour
Ministry |
Finance Ministry |
Other Ministries and departments |
Regional & local integration |
Formal
Interest organisations (social partners) |
Informal
interest organisations (NGOs) |
|
HIGH |
|
5 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
|
|
5 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
|
|
MEDIUM |
|
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
|
|
5 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
|
|
|
5 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
The |
5 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
4 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
|
|
LOW |
|
5 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
5 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
3 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
|
5 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
For the institutional integration of the various
actors (in columns 1 to 8), different degrees of involvement can be identified,
where 0 is the lowest and 5 is the highest.
0. none or information ex-post;
1. information (meeting) ex-ante and throughout;
2. separate contribution or opinion to NAP, but
minimal or no integration;
3. separate contribution or opinion to NAP, with
high and substantial integration;
4. contribution in drafting of the report or
separate “plan” or contribution of different levels of government or plans for
different levels of government;
5. Finalisation of the report
2.
Social Inclusion
a.
Policy Community
The
core policy community set up as a result of the OMCincl. is constituted around
Social Ministries. As for the EES, various ministries and departments that have
a stake in poverty as a policy issue are involved in the OMCincl.. However, the
Finance ministries are not as substantially involved as for the EES, as
anti-poverty policies are further away from policies related to the promotion
of economic growth. At European level, the representatives of
the Social Ministries, which are responsible at national level for writing the
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPincl), meet regularly in the Social
Protection Committee (SPC). It was established in 2000 (officially endorsed in article
144, EC Treaty) where one of the four objectives of its mandate was to work in
the field of poverty and social exclusion.[57]
Like EMCO, it has an “advisory status” and prepares reports and formulates
opinions at the request of either the Council or the Commission or on its own
initiative. Its mandate has in actual fact been guided by the European
Councils, where one of its two key tasks has become social inclusion and the
other pensions, both using the OMC. The national members of the SPC have the
responsibility to report upwards to the European level and downwards to the
regional and local levels for setting policy. According to the political
incentives contained in the objectives of the OMCincl. Itself,[58]
the policy community should include
all public authorities at national, regional, and local levels in all aspects
of the policy process, by developing appropriate vertical co-ordination procedures. As indicated in table 2 below,
in the area of social inclusion and anti-poverty policies, substantial
responsibilities are devolved to the regional and local levels: in five
countries, these are core responsibilities, but even in the other countries,
responsibility in this area is high, especially in administration and
implementation of schemes pertaining to the fight against poverty. The OMCincl. should thus, due to political
incentives in the OMCincl. itself and
also due to the institutional structures of the domestic policy-making in
anti-poverty policy (see table 2, columns 2 – 5 below), lead to the development
of multi-level policy communities. At this stage, they have been developed in
many countries, particularly where there were coordination problems and where
the various levels of governance have core responsibilities in policies that
are directly related to poverty prevention, in particular social assistance
policies.[59]
In some countries, the OMCincl. has acted as an incentive for the lower levels
of governance to assert their power versus central governments at the national
level.[60]
Table 2:
Institutional Configuration of policy-making and participation in anti-poverty
policy.[61]
|
|
Domestic
Institutional Model |
Institutional Configuration of Participation in OMCincl.
|
||||
|
Dimension/ Country |
Guidance,
Rules, Financing |
Administration,
Implementation |
Reporting,
targeting, monitoring |
NGO
and PP Participation |
Participation anti-poverty NGOs in OMCincl. (consultation) |
Participation of people experiencing poverty in OMCincl.
|
|
|
National,
local |
Local |
II |
III |
3 |
2 |
|
|
National,local |
Local |
III |
III |
3 |
2 |
|
The |
National |
Local |
II |
II |
1 |
0 |
|
|
National |
Dept,local |
II |
II |
1 |
0 |
|
|
Federal,Regional |
Regional,local |
I |
Federal:
III Regional:
I |
3 |
2 |
|
|
National |
Local |
III |
III |
3 |
2 |
|
|
National,
Regional |
Regional/Local |
II |
National:
III Regional:
II |
3 |
2 |
|
Lux |
National |
Local |
II |
II |
3 |
2 |
|
|
Lander |
Local |
I |
I |
0 |
0 |
|
|
National,
regional |
National,
regional |
III |
II |
3 |
2 |
|
|
Regional,
local |
Regional,
local |
I |
National:
I Regional:
I |
0 |
0 |
|
|
Regional |
Regional |
I |
National:
II Regional:
I |
3 |
0 |
|
|
National |
National |
I |
National:
I |
0 |
2 |
|
|
National |
National |
I |
National:
I |
3 |
2 |
|
|
National |
National |
III |
III |
3 |
2 |
Domestic traditions in
monitoring and reporting as well as domestic traditions of participation of
NGOs in the conception of anti-poverty policy are indicated according to the
scale below.
I: Low Development
II: Medium Development
III: High Development
For the institutional integration of the
various actors (in columns 1 to 8), different degrees of involvement can be
identified, where 0 is the lowest and 5 is the highest.
0: none or
information ex-post;
1:
indicates that there is information ex-ante by the government but no
integration of their contributions.
2: indicates that there is genuine consultation by the government with
non-governmental groups (EAPN network, other non-governmental groups, people
experiencing poverty) and minimal integration of the work of the group
3:
indicates that there is genuine consultation by the government with
non-governmental groups (EAPN network, other non-governmental groups, people
experiencing poverty) and substantial integration of the work of the group
b.
Policy Network
Concerning
the broader policy network created around the OMCincl., there is a legal
mandate for the involvement of social partners and an issue-specific political
mandate for the involvement of civil society organisations. Concerning social
partners, article 144 EC Treaty states that the Committee should establish
“appropriate” contacts with social partners, but the empirical evidence reveals
that social partners have in most cases not played a role.[62]
At national level, there is evidence of genuine social partner participation in
the social inclusion strategy in
While
there is in article 144 EC Treaty no reference to civil society involvement in
the process, the political mandate is quite strong. The OMCincl. objectives embody an ambitious participative aim, to
mobilise all actors concerned in the development, implementation and monitoring
of anti-poverty policies. According to these objectives, aside the core
policy community, the OMC should consist of enhancing horizontal dialogue and
partnership between all relevant bodies, public and private, including social
partners, NGOs and social service providers, and of encouraging the social
responsibility and active engagement of all citizens in the fight against
social exclusion, as well as of fostering the social responsibility of
business. It also sets out to promote the participation and self-expression of
excluded persons.[64]
For NGOs involved broadly in fighting against social exclusion, the fight
against poverty, which is the main objective of the OMCincl., is in line with
the concerns of these organisations, although the work-based focus of the OMCincl.
is not. Compared to social partners in the area of employment, NGOs in the
domestic context have weaker legitimately recognised channels for putting
forward their policy issues, although this has increased during the 1990s
(Pochet, 2004a). Given their comparatively weak institutional means for setting
issues on the national policy agenda, they would a priori be more likely
to use the European level as a vehicle through which to put forward the policy
issues on their agenda. The OMCincl.
has overall acted as a tool which has empowered the non-state actors that have
been seeking a legitimate institutional means for influencing policy. In
countries where this already existed, notably
3.
Comparing OMC Participation in Employment and Social Inclusion
The
participatory dynamics of the core policy communities in Employment and Social
Inclusion are similar: governmental actors in the relevant ministries structure
the process. They include various other governmental departments horizontally,
and in some cases vertically. The vertical integration of lower levels of
government is stronger where regional and/or local level actors are seeking to
strengthen their own position and to determine a clear policy agenda,
especially vis-à-vis their national ministries. Devolution to lower levels of
government is relevant particularly where lower level actors have competencies
in labour market and anti-poverty policies. While regional actors have in some
cases found the policy agenda of the OMCs relevant for their own purposes, it
is more difficult for local level actors to grasp, since they are more
concerned with concrete actions and measures, rather than broad policy
aims.
The
participatory dynamics of the broader policy networks in the EES and OMCincl. is
dissimilar in terms of the actors involved and the usage of OMC-derived employment
and anti-poverty policy agendas. Involvement of interest organisations is determined
above all by the actors’ own pursuits, institutionalised power structures and political
agendas. In the EES, the legal basis in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the political
incentives by the European Commission, supported by the Council (including the
Kok reports[67]
that influenced the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005) call for
substantial social partner involvement in the EES. Despite this, and although
participation of social partners in the EES has improved incrementally over
time, usage of the EES as a genuine policy-setting instrument has been weak. The
NAPempl is overall not considered a strategic document by social partners, and
the issues tackled under the EES only overlap partially with the core
bargaining agenda of the social partners. National level social partners have institutionalised
roles in most Member States: they are consulted and/or informed formally
about labour market and employment policies. Their exchange with public
authorities is structured via bi- or tri-partite institutions and in certain
areas, social partners have a co-regulatory role.[68]
In the OMCincl., civil society actors have a weak legal basis for becoming more
involved, but strong political and institutional incentives, from both the
European and national levels. The position and role of anti-poverty civil
society organisations in the institutional structures of the Member States has
been enhanced since the beginning of the 1990s, but they are not nearly as deeply
rooted in the national contexts as the social partners.[69]
Their incentive to use the OMCincl. for their policy agenda and to strengthen
their position in negotiations with public authorities has been quite strong,
particularly as the agenda of the NGOs is close to the anti-poverty objectives
of the OMCincl.. Some central NGOs, notably under the auspices of the EAPN,
have sought to influence decision-makers at national and European levels. This
has been supported by the fact that there is a direct financial incentive for
NGO participation, through the resources of the Community Action Programme to
Combat Social Exclusion (2002 – 2006), and PROGRESS (2007-2013). However,
social exclusion is not a priority on most national agendas, and the resources
for financing activities are scarce.[70]
In
essence, participation from the domestic perspective is determined by the
actors’ pre-existing institutional and political sources for influencing
policy: where this is more institutionalised, then the genuine usage of the OMC
is likely to be weaker. Conversely, where actors have a less institutionalised
role, then the OMC can play a useful role in agenda setting, policy planning,
and governance. This explains the quite low level of take up of the EES by
social partners, and the relatively high level of take up of the OMCincl. by
NGOs.
B. Coherence
1.
Employment
The
heart of the EES – that of increasing the employment rate of the European Union
and its
First, regarding its legal status, the overarching
aim and mode of functioning of the EES is set out in the Employment Title of
the Amsterdam Treaty (articles
125 EC – 130 EC). Its objective is to achieve a high level of
employment, through the promotion of “…a skilled, trained and adaptable
workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change” and by
incorporating employment policy concerns with other Community policies and
activities (article 125 EC). In line with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States
“… regard promoting employment as a matter of common concern”
(Article 126 EC), where the role of the Community was to “contribute to a high
level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States and by
supporting, and if necessary, complementing their action.” This legal status
was agreed at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. It shows that employment
promotion, and not the fight against unemployment, was the main backbone to the
policy content agreed by all Member States in the context of the EES. As it is
a broad aim set out in a legal document, it was set out in an apolitical way –
i.e. neither leaning towards the socio-democratic conception, suggesting high
levels of employment together with generous welfare provisions and high quality
of employment, or the other extreme, the liberal workfare conception, where
quality in employment, matching of qualifications or associated social benefits
are not mentioned.
The
precise policy-oriented foundation for the Strategy was set substantively on
the basis of the legal framework provided by the Amsterdam EC Treaty. In
November 1997, an Extraordinary Summit was organised to define Employment
policy objectives – “EEG” - in order for the EU and its
As
has been well documented in the academic literature, the Lisbon European
Council in 2000 confirmed its support for the EES and it represented a key
moment in the development of the political commitment of Member States to
Employment Policy objectives. While agreement had since 1997, at the political
level of the Council, been on the “full employment” objective for the Union,
this was not coupled with quantitative employment rate targets at the level of
the European Council until
Nevertheless, and despite
inherent ideological ambiguity relating to the EES, but also to the activation
concept itself, there has been temporal consistency of the policy objectives of
the EES. According to the EES agenda, “employability” is defined as an
important means for supporting the development of a broader aim, to develop a
full employment society. Furthermore, the full employment model has been
re-enforced as of the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, supported by the
amalgamation of the economic and employment coordination processes.[81]
2.
Social Inclusion
The development of social inclusion policy
objectives is nested in the conception of the European social model, that: ‘…places considerable emphasis on maintaining
social solidarity and ensuring that all individuals are integrated into, and
participate in, a national social and moral order’.[82]
The Commission’s conception of social exclusion relates the incidence of
poverty and disadvantage among some groups and in some locations to wider
processes of economic and welfare state restructuring. It also emphasises the manifest
nature of disadvantage and looks beyond issues of income inequality to
incorporate the social and cultural aspects of disadvantage, as well as the
notion of citizenship rights.[83]
Regarding
the conception of poverty in the legal texts of the European Union, a provision
for the fight against poverty and social exclusion as an objective for the
Union and its
The objectives that make up the policy content
on OMCincl., are as follows. For each objective I will indicate the main
ideological conception(s) concerned.
1. Facilitate access to employment for all citizens as the most
effective tool against social exclusion. This objective is clearly associated
with a full employment society, which is overall coherent at the European level
with the European economic and employment objectives. It can either be
interpreted in the sense of workfare, to employ people independently of the
social circumstances that these entail, or in a broader socio-democratic
conception, where quality of employment and associated issues can be included.
2. Provide access for all citizens
to social rights that contribute to
the development of an approach to prevent
risks of exclusion. This aim promotes the creation of a preventative
rights-based approach to combat monetary and non-monetary poverty. It also
seeks to implement policies that seek to provide access to education, housing,
health and other services, such as culture, and justice. It is in line with the
anti-poverty model that has traditionally and historically been implemented in
continental
3. Target actions for groups at the risk of
social exclusion, seeking curatively
to provide a temporary financial support for the excluded, as well as to
promote their broader societal integration. The groups targeted are the
disabled, older persons, women (emphasis increased since 2003), immigrants, and
other groups at the risk of exclusion. A benchmark, to eliminate child poverty
by 2010, was agreed in 2005. This objective is in the opposite ideological
conception than the previous objective, and seeks to target groups, in line
with the Anglo-Saxon tradition in fighting poverty.
4.
The last policy objective concerns the policy
community and especially the policy
network involved in the setting of anti-poverty strategy. This tradition
has roots in the Nordic countries, but also more recently in
The core of this ideologically merged European
conception of poverty embodied in these four objectives for social inclusion
has been extended subsequently. However, in terms of the underlying ideological
notions that underlie this conception of poverty, it has not been altered. The
extension in 2003 concerned more attention to the gendered dimension of
poverty, and the integration of vulnerable groups, particularly immigrants.[85]
The policy objectives were accompanied by various quantitative indicators,
first agreed in December 2001 and expanded since then. The main achievement in
terms of indicators is to have agreed a European poverty threshold – at 60% of
the median income – that allows for comparison of poverty across EU. The main
tension in these objectives is between the rights-based versus the targeted
conceptions of poverty, which are nested in two divergent ideological
conceptions. The rights-based approach has been the tradition in the Nordic and
Continental welfare state models, and the targeted approach in the Beveridgian
Anglo-Saxon welfare state models. The ideological contradictions in the OMCincl.
lie not so much in one core concept (as
employability for the EES), as in the combination of objectives. Nevertheless,
the objectives of the OMCincl. are overall coherent with the overarching Full
Employment Model defined at
3. Comparing OMC
Coherence in Employment and Social Inclusion
The overall policy coherence of the OMC in
Employment has been consistent over time, promoting “employability” and “activation”. These means have
been assumed to lead to full employment, which has become increasingly explicit
as an all-encompassing policy aim not only in the EES, but also in the Lisbon
Strategy. But, many of the EES objectives are inherently ambiguous in that they
can be conceptualised according to various ideological orientations. For example,
since the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, the concept of flexicurity
as a means to enhance the economic and employment growth of
The
overall policy coherence of the OMC in Social Inclusion temporally has been
consistent in seeking to include people in society through work, to develop a
rights-based approach and to target actions towards vulnerable groups. The
work-based approach, as well as the targetting of actions towards particular
groups, overlaps with the EES agenda. Another aspect of the OMCincl., promoting
social rights for all citizens, sets a comprehensive quality of life model to
complement the economically driven full employment model promoted by the EES. Targetting
people in or at the risk of poverty complements this approach, although from an
ideological perspective it is in tension with the rights-based approach.
Nevertheless, conceptualisation of poverty at the European level through the OMCincl.
has been important for many Member States that are facing increasingly
diversified forms of exclusion. While there are no over-arching quantitative
benchmarks, the European Union has defined, through the OMCincl., a poverty
threshold of 60% of the median income. It is becoming an increasingly important
reference point in the context of the creation of a new European database on
social conditions (EU-SILC). The Inclusion process is, however, at the margins
of Union policy, and has since the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 been
de-coupled from the core economic-employment growth aims of the
Together, the OMC in Employment and in Social
Inclusion support the economic growth and full employment model, by increasing
the employment rate of the
C. Effectiveness
1.
Employment
The
analysis of effectiveness in the area of employment will present two sets of
data regarding core objectives of the EES. The first is the evolution of
expenditure in labour market policies for the EU-14[86]
(Table 3), organised from highest to lowest levels of expenditure on active labour
market policies (ALMP)[87],
at the situation in 1999, to allow for detecting how “employability” evolves in
the years of implementation of the EES.[88]
Three clusters have been identified: high, medium and low expenditure
countries. There is also an indication (column 2) of the welfare state
configuration that the country belongs to, which will be referred to in the
discussion. The main data on ALMP (columns 2 – 6) represents the
“employability” objectives of the EES.[89]
Column 7 indicates whether there has mostly been an increase or rather a
decrease in expenditure on ALMP for the different countries of the EU (14). This
data is confronted with the expenditure on passive labour market policies
(PLMP) (columns 8 – 11),[90]
which the EES implicitly discourages. Column 9 indicates whether during the
period under consideration, there has overall been an increase or decrease in
expenditure on labour market policies. The second (Table 4) is the evolution of
general and female employment rates for all EU countries between 1993 and 2005.
This is a core objective in employment, as the EU agreed quantitative
employment rate benchmarks for the Union and its Member States, to be reached
by 2010: 70% general employment rate and 60% female employment rate.[91]
It is important to take into account that the changes in expenditure on labour
market policies and changes in employment rates may be due to major
macro-economic factors such as economic growth and demographic changes. The aim
of the analysis is to point to how the core objectives of the EES have evolved
in Member States, which provides an indication of the influence of the policy
objectives of the EES. However, any congruence or incongruence between the EES
objectives and the outcome (in terms of expenditure on ALMP and employment
rates) needs to be treated with caution, as it is not a proved causal
relationship.
Table 3:
Evolution in Expenditure patterns for active (ALM) and passive labour market
(PLM) policies 1999 – 2004 (EU-14)[92]
|
Country |
Welfare
state |
ALM
1999 |
ALM 2001 |
ALM
2003 |
ALM
2004 |
+/- |
|
PLM
1999 |
PLM
2001 |
PLM
2003 |
PLM
2004 |
+/- |
|
“High
Expenditure” Countries |
|
|||||||||||
|
DK |
Nordic |
1.839 |
1.649 |
1.516 |
1.523 |
- |
2.579 |
2.290 |
2.659 |
2.672 |
+ |
|
|
SWE |
Nordic |
1.997 |
1.452 |
1.033 |
1.002 |
- |
1.680 |
1.072 |
1.209 |
1.316 |
- |
|
|
“Medium
Expenditure” Countries |
|
|||||||||||
|
FR |
Cons |
1.046 |
.956 |
.824 |
.726 |
- |
1.516 |
1.410 |
1.737 |
1.718 |
+ |
|
|
BE |
Cons |
1.025 |
0.996 |
0.993 |
0.920 |
- |
2.369 |
2.247 |
2.468 |
2.406 |
+ |
|
|
DE |
Cons |
1.070 |
0.956 |
0.950 |
0.854 |
- |
2.111 |
1.924 |
2.281 |
2.314 |
+ |
|
|
NL |
Cons |
.952 |
1.168 |
1.206 |
1.123 |
+ |
2.140 |
1.876 |
2.022 |
2.233 |
+ |
|
|
SF |
Nordic |
.945 |
.710 |
.746 |
.780 |
- |
2.375 |
2.018 |
2.088 |
2.028 |
- |
|
|
IRL |
A-S |
.878 |
.730 |
.588 |
.492 |
- |
1.102 |
0.696 |
0.885 |
0.897 |
- |
|
|
IT |
South |
.557[93] |
.623 |
.683 |
.547 |
- |
0.682 |
0.623 |
0.663 |
0.760 |
+ |
|
|
“Low
Expenditure” Countries |
|
|||||||||||
|
SP |
South |
.649 |
.606 |
.562 |
.551 |
- |
1.477 |
1.371 |
1.457 |
1.498 |
+ |
|
|
POR |
South |
.335 |
.492 |
.516 |
.552 |
+ |
.851 |
1.030 |
1.219 |
1.319 |
+ |
|
|
GR |
South |
.269 |
.278 |
.109 |
.166 |
- |
0.446 |
0.397 |
0.410 |
0.448 |
+ |
|
|
AUT |
Cons |
.408 |
.428 |
.449 |
.431 |
+ |
1.313 |
1.183 |
1.365 |
1.394 |
+ |
|
|
|
A-S |
0.195 |
0.160 |
0.160 |
0.160 |
- |
0.555 |
0.394 |
0.343 |
0.285 |
- |
|
The
literature on the effect of the EES through “learning” (Effectiveness Type 1)
highlights that over the last decade, there has been a shift to “activation”
policies, that is at least partially due to the EES. But, while providing
useful insights, this literature remains ambiguous regarding the precise means
of influence of the EES on the politics and practice of labour market reforms.[94]
One indicator to obtain some data on the evolution of employability policies in Member States is
that of expenditure on ALMP, which has not been analysed systematically. Politically,
there is an assumption that activation and employability are important means to
counter unemployment and to increase employment rates. Crossing the
employability data with unemployment rates would allow for more precise
conclusions to be drawn as to the development of ALMP as a response to
unemployment. However, more complex analyses are beyond the scope of this
article that merely seeks to create some yardsticks against which to assess
effectiveness of the OMC. Nevertheless, the trends in expenditure on ALMP and
PLMP provide general indications of the overall direction of reform across the
EU-15.
Table
3 above shows that expenditure on ALMP has decreased between 1999 and 2004 for
all countries but the
Table 4:
Evolution of Total Employment Rate (TER) and Female Employment Rate (FER) between
1993 and 2005 (indication as % GDP)[95]
|
Country |
1993
TER |
1993 FER |
1995 TER |
1995 FER |
1997 TER |
1997 FER |
1999 TER |
1999 FER |
2001 TER |
2001 FER |
2003 TER |
2003 FER |
2005 TER |
2005 FER |
%
r TER |
%
r FER |
|
“High
Expenditure” Countries |
||||||||||||||||
|
DK |
72,1 |
68,2 |
73,4 |
66,7 |
74,9 |
69,1 |
76,0 |
71,1 |
76,2 |
72,0 |
75,1 |
70,5 |
75,9 |
71,9 |
3,8 |
3,7 |
|
SWE |
71,3 |
69,7 |
70,9 |
68,8 |
69,5 |
67,2 |
71,7 |
69,4 |
74,0 |
72,3 |
72,9 |
71,5 |
72,5 |
70,4 |
1,2 |
0,7 |
|
“Medium
Expenditure” Countries |
||||||||||||||||
|
FR |
59,3 |
51,3 |
59,5 |
52,1 |
59,6 |
52,4 |
60,9 |
54,0 |
62,8 |
56,0 |
63,3 |
57,3 |
63,1 |
57,6 |
3,8 |
6,3 |
|
BE |
55,8 |
44,5 |
56,1 |
45,0 |
56,8 |
46,5 |
59,3 |
50,4 |
59,9 |
51,0 |
59,6 |
51,8 |
61,1 |
53,8 |
5,3 |
9,3 |
|
DE |
65,1 |
55,1 |
64,6 |
55,3 |
63,7 |
55,3 |
65,2 |
57,4 |
65,8 |
58,7 |
65,0 |
58,9 |
65,4 |
59,6 |
0,3 |
4,5 |
|
NL |
63,6 |
52,2 |
64,7 |
53,8 |
68,5 |
58,0 |
71,7 |
62,3 |
74,1 |
65,2 |
73,6 |
66,0 |
73,2 |
66,4 |
9,6 |
14,2 |
|
SF |
61,0 |
59,5 |
61,6 |
59,0 |
63,3 |
60,3 |
66,4 |
63,4 |
68,1 |
65,4 |
67,7 |
65,7 |
68,4 |
66,5 |
7,4 |
6,0 |
|
IRL |
51,7 |
38,5 |
54,4 |
41,6 |
57,6 |
45,9 |
63,3 |
52,0 |
65,8 |
54,9 |
65,5 |
55,7 |
67,6 |
58,3 |
15,9 |
19,8 |
|
“Low
Expenditure” Countries |
||||||||||||||||
|
IT |
52,3 |
35,8 |
51,0 |
35,4 |
51,3 |
36,4 |
52,7 |
38,3 |
54,8 |
41,1 |
56,1 |
42,7 |
57,6 |
45,3 |
5,3 |
9,5 |
|
ES |
46,6 |
30,7 |
46,9 |
31,7 |
49,5 |
34,6 |
53,8 |
38,5 |
57,8 |
43,1 |
59,8 |
46,3 |
63,3 |
51,2 |
16,7 |
20,5 |
|
POR |
65,1 |
55,0 |
63,7 |
54,4 |
65,7 |
56,5 |
67,4 |
59,4 |
69.0 |
61,3 |
68,1 |
61,4 |
67,5 |
61,7 |
2,5 |
6,7 |
|
GR |
53,7 |
36,6 |
54,7 |
38,1 |
55,1 |
39,3 |
55,9 |
41,0 |
56,3 |
41,5 |
58,7 |
44,3 |
60,1 |
46,1 |
6,4 |
9,5 |
|
AUT |
- |
- |
68,8 |
59,0 |
67,8 |
58,6 |
68,6 |
59,6 |
68,5 |
60,7 |
68,9 |
61,6 |
68,9 |
62,0 |
0,1 |
3,0 |
|
|
67,4 |
60,8 |
68,5 |
61,7 |
69,9 |
63,1 |
71,0 |
64,2 |
71,4 |
65,0 |
71,5 |
65,3 |
71,7 |
65,9 |
4,3 |
5,1 |
TER:
Total employment rate
FER:
Female employment rate
%
r: Change
(in all cases increase) in % of employment rates between 1993 and 2005.
The trend in “high expenditure” countries, both
from the Nordic Welfare State model, is of cost-cutting in ALMP. Interestingly,
this trend has been much stronger in
In the “medium
expenditure” countries, a distinction in outcome can be drawn between the core
conservative countries (
However, there have been proportionally
much higher increases in the female employment rates (% r
of TER:
In the other
countries of the medium expenditure group – the